

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8466  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
USINT CAIRO  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 TEL AVIV 3903

EXDIS

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TAGS: PFOR, PBOR, IS, XF

SUBJECT: DAYAN' S THINKING ON POSSIBLE PEACE ARRANGEMENTS WITH  
JORDAN AND EGYPT

REF: TEL AVIV 3837

SUMMARY: CLOSE DAYAN POLITICAL ALLY GAD YAACOBI IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION HAS TOLD EMBOFF DAYAN IS CONCENTRATING THESE ON WHAT ISRAELI POLICY SHOULD BE TOWARD WEST BANK BEFORE FINAL SETTLEMENT ACHIEVED. THEREFORE, DAYAN' S IDEAS ON FINAL PEACE ARRANGEMENTS WITH EITHER JORDAN OR EGYPT WERE SOMEWHAT TENTATIVE. YAACOBI SAID DAYAN PREPARING MOVES TO BRING ABOUT FURTHER LIBERALIZATION OPEN BRIDGES POLICY AND DEGREE OF AUTONOMY FOR WEST BANK MUNICIPALITIES. AS FOR DAYAN' S THINKING ON ULTIMATE PEACE SETTLEMENT WITH JORDAN, YAACOBI SAID DAYAN WOULD RETURN ONLY ONE OR TWO SMALL ENCLAVES OF WEST BANK. BUT DAYAN ACCORDING TO YAACOBI ENVISAGES REST OF WEST BANK POPULATON THOUGH LIVING UNDER ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY AS BEING FULLFLEDGED JORDANIAN CITIZENS, WITH EXCEPTION INHABITANTS OF RAMALLAH AND BETHLEHEM WHO WOULD BECOME ISRAELI CITIZENS. ACCORDING TO YAACOBI DAYAN ASSUMES NO EFFORTS TOWARD ACCOMMODATION WITH EGYPT BEFORE KNESSET ELECTIONS AND CURRENTLY IS NOT FOCUSING ON THIS SUBJECT. HIS MOST RECENT IDEAS CENTERED ON  
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NOTION THAT SINAI SHOULD BECOME MILITARY VACUUM, WITH ONLY ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN ELECTRONIC CREWS STATIONED ON CENTRAL SINAI MOUNTAIN TOPS TO MONITOR MOVEMENTS IN AND OUT OF MAIN AIRFIELDS OF OTHER SIDE'S COUNTRY. YAACOBI BELIEVED THAT DAYAN ASSUMES THERE WILL BE PERMANENT ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE AT SHARM EL-SHEIKH, BUT YAACOBI SPECULATED THAT IF EGYPTIANS SATISFIED DAYAN ON OTHER POINTS AND REAL PEACE WAS IN PROSPECTS, DAYAN CONCEIVABLY WOULD FAVOR ACCEDING TO ANY EGYPTIAN REQUEST THAT SHARM BE INCLUDED IN SINAI MILITARY VACUUM. MAIN OTHER POINTS ON WHICH DAYAN WOULD REQUIRE EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT WOULD BE: ISRAELI ADMINISTRATION (NOT NECESSARILY FORMAL SOVEREIGNTY) OVER SHARM AND CORRIDOR TO IT; AND REDRAWING OF PRE-1967 BORDER TO INCLUDE RAFAH JUNCTION PLUS AREA WEST OF EILAT IN ISRAEL. END SUMMARY.

1. IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION MAY 16 EMBOFF ASKED DAYAN CONFIDANT AND DEPUTY TRANSPORT MINISTER YAACOBI FOR GENERAL OUTLINE OF DAYAN'S VIEWS ON POLICY TOWARD WEST BANK IN ABSENCE OF PEACE SETTLEMENT AS WELL AS ON EVENTUAL PEACE ARRANGEMENTS WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT. YAACOBI SAID HE WOULD BE GLAD TO DESCRIBE DAYAN'S THINKING ON THESE SUBJECTS BECAUSE SOME CONFUSION HAS RESULTED FROM RECENT DAYAN STATEMENTS. YAACOBI BELIEVED THAT MAIN CAUSE OF OVERALL CONFUSION WAS THAT DAYAN HAS BEEN FOCUSING PRIMARILY ON WHAT ISRAEL SHOULD DO IN WEST BANK PENDING FINAL SETTLEMENT, WHEREAS OTHER ISRAELI POLITICIANS HAVE INSISTED ON ADDRESSING NATURE OF FINAL SETTLEMENT AS IT WOULD AFFECT WEST BANK.

2. POPULAR MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF DAYAN. TURNING TO DAYAN INTERVIEWS OF MAY 9 AND 14 (REFTEL), YAACOBI NOTED THREE MISUNDERSTANDINGS WIDELY HELD IN ISRAEL AS RESULT OF MANNER IN WHICH MEDIA HAD PLAYED INTERVIEWS. A) SOME PEOPLE ARE UNDER IMPRESSION DAYAN IS READY TODAY TO RETURN MOST IF NOT ALL OF WEST BANK TO JORDAN. YAACOBI SAID THIS IS NOT TRUE AND RESULTS FROM OVER-EMPHASIS BY MEDIA ON DAYAN COMMENT HE WOULD BE OPPOSED TO INCORPORATING ADDITIONAL ONE MILLION ARAB CITIZENS INTO ISRAEL IF THIS WERE AT ISSUE TODAY AND THEREFORE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE UP WEST BANK IN THEORY. B) MANY IN ISRAEL HAVE MISREAD DAYAN'S ASSERTION OF THEORETICAL READINESS TO SERVE IN CABINET UNDER SAPIR AS PRIMIN AS BEING DAYAN FEELER FOR COOPERATION WITH SAPIR. IN

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YAACOBI'S ESTIMATION DAYAN IS CONVINCED THERE IS ALMOST NO CHANCE HE AND SAPIR CAN MOVE CLOSE ENOUGH IN THEIR OUTLOOKS TO ENABLE DAYAN TO SERVE IN A SAPIR CABINET. C) INACCURATE VIEW ISRAELIS GATHERED FROM DAYAN'S JOCUAR REMARK TO BBC INTERVIEWER THAT HE WOULD RATHER SEE EGYPTIAN TROOPS THAN UN FORCES IN SINAI IN THAT DAYAN IS INDIFFERENT ON QUESTION OF WHETHER CAIRO SHOULD BE PERMITTED UNDER SETTLEMENT TO PLACE COMBAT

TROOPS IN SINAI. YAACOBİ SAID DAYAN IS STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF ARRANGEMENT UNDER WHICH NEITHER EGYPT NOR ISRAEL WOULD HAVE FORCES IN SINAI AND SINAI WOULD SERVE AS BUFFER AREA BY BECOMING MILITARY VACUUM.

3. WEST BANK PENDING PEACE SETTLEMENT. YAACOBİ SAID DAYAN IS CERTAIN FINAL SETTLEMENT WITH JORDAN WILL NOT COME FOR TWENTY YEARS. DAYAN ACCORDING TO YAACOBİ BELIEVES THAT WHEN SETTLEMENT DOES COME, JORDAN BY THAT TIME WILL HAVE BEEN TAKEN OVER BY PALESTINIANS BECAUSE OF THEIR NUMBERS AND ABILITIES, AND CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT, PROBABLY A PRESIDENT, WILL BE PALESTINIAN. DAYAN BELIEVES THIS MAY SIMPLIFY FINAL SETTLEMENT.

A. DURING LENGTHLY INTERIM PENDING FINAL SETTLEMENT, YAACOBİ STATED DAYAN FEELS ISRAEL SHOULD DO EVERYTHING TO ENCOURAGE WEST BANKERS TO ORIENT THEMSELVES TOWARD AMMAN. DAYAN PREDICTS WEST BANKERS IN DUE COURSE WILL DEMAND EXERCISE OF THEIR POLITICAL RIGHTS AS JORDANIAN CITIZENS, INCLUDING OPPORTUNITY TO VOTE IN JORDANIAN ELECTIONS, AND AMMAN WILL HAVE TO PERMIT THIS.

B. TO FURTHER PROCESS OF ORIENTING WEST BANKERS TOWARD AMMAN, YAACOBİ SAID DAYAN HAS IN MIND EXPANSION OF OPEN BRIDGES POLICY. YAACOBİ SHARED DAYAN'S PREDICTION THAT THIS WOULD WORK, NOTING THAT EVERYONE HAD DOUBTED DAYAN'S PREDICTION IN 1969 OF SUCCESS WHICH POLICY WOULD ACHIEVE IN THREE YEARS, BUT DAYAN HAD BEEN PROVEN RIGHT. ACCORDING TO YAACOBİ, DAYAN WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR OVERWHELMING CABINET VOTE MAY 12 IN FAVOR OF EXTENDING ISRAEL'S PRESENT WEST BANK SUMMER VISITOR PROGRAM TO YEAR ROUND BASIS. DAYAN HAD IN MIND OTHER MEASURES WHICH GOI COULD TAKE TO FACILITATE MOVEMENT BACK AND FORTH.

C. NEXT MOST IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE FOR DAYAN RE WEST BANK, YAACOBİ SAID, IS FOR ISRAELIS TO SETTLE EVERYWHERE AND NOT JUST  
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WITHIN LINES OF ALLON PLAN. YAACOBİ SAID ONLY QUALIFICATION

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

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EXDIS

DAYAN MAKES AS TO LOCATIONS OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IS THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE WITHIN ARAB METROPOLITAN AREAS, WITH EXCEPTION OF GREATER JERUSALEM AREA, WHICH DAYAN WOULD LIKE TO EXPAND TO INCLUDE BETHLEHEM AND RAMALLAH.

D. YAACOBBI SAID THIRD BASIC PRINCIPLE FOR DAYAN IS THAT ISRAELI MILITARY FORCES MUST CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN SECURITY CONTROL THROUGHOUT WEST BANK. AT SAME TIME DAYAN FAVORS INCREASING AUTONOMY FOR LOCAL MUNICIPALITIES INCLUDING BROADER ROLE FOR LOCAL POLICE. YAACOBBI PREDICTED DAYAN WOULD SOON START MOVING TO EXPAND THEIR AUTONOMY.

4. WEST BANK UNDER EVENTUAL FINAL SETTLEMENT. RECALLING DAYAN'S CONVICTION THAT FINAL SETTLEMENT IS SOME TWENTY YEARS AWAY, YAACOBBI SAID DAYAN INTENTIONALLY HAS NOT COME TO FIRM CONCLUSIONS ABOUT HOW FINAL SETTLEMENT SHOULD LOOK IN RELATION TO WEST BANK. YAACOBBI OUTLINED DAYAN'S TENTATIVE VIEWS AS FOLLOWS.

A. METROPOLITAN COMPLEX OF NABLUS- JENIN SHOULD BECOME TERRITORY UNDER SOVEREIGNTY OF ARAB NATION EAST OF JORDAN RIVER. AREA WOULD INCLUDE ROUGHLY ONE- THIRD OF WEST BANK ARAB POPULATION. IT WOULD CONSTITUTE ENCLAVE SMALLER THAN THE ONE ENVISAGED UNDER ALLON PLAN FOR NORTHERN PART OF

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WEST BANK. ALSO UNLIKE THRUST OF ALLON PLAN, DAYAN WOULD EXPECT ISRAELI MILITARY FORCES TO CONTINUE TO HAVE INTERNAL SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN ENCLAVE, WORKING IN COOPERATION WITH LOCAL ARAB POLICE.

B. DAYAN WOULD EXPECT ENLARGE JERUSALEM AREA INCLUDING RAMALLAH AND BETHLEHEM TO BE INCORPORATED INTO ISRAEL WITH ITS ARAB INHABITANTS BECOMING ISRAELI CITIZENS.

C. IN DAYAN'S VIEW, REST OF WEST BANK ACCORDING TO YAACOBBI SHOULD PROBABLY ALSO BE ANNEXED TO ISRAEL, BUT WITH

PROVISO THAT ARAB INHABITANTS WOULD BE CITIZENS OF ARAB STATE EAST OF JORDAN RIVER. YAACOBİ SAİD DAYAN HAS NOT ENTİRELY DECİDED WHETHER HE WOULD FAVOR CREATION OF VERY SMALL ENCLAVE AROUND HEBRON WHICH LIKE ENCLAVE TO NORTH WOULD BE SOVEREIGN TERRİTORY OF ARAB STATE EAST OF JORDAN RIVER. YAACOBİ PREDİCTED DAYAN WOULD DECİDE AGAINST HEBRON ENCLAVE.

5. GAZA STRİP. YAACOBİ NOTED DAYAN HAS ALWAYS TAKEN GREAT CARE TO LİMIT HIS PUBLIC UTTERANCES ABOUT FUTURE OF GAZA TO SAYİNG THAT EGYPTİANS SHOULD NEVER EXPECT TO RETURN THERE. İN YAACOBİ' S OPİNİON SİLENCE OF DAYAN RE SOVEREİGNTY İSSUE MEANS HE ALLOWS FOR POSSİBİLİTY THAT GAZA MİGHT BECOME AUTONOMOUS REGION AND MİGHT BE AFFİLİATED İN SOME FASİON WITH ARAB STATE EAST OF JORDAN RIVER.

6. SİNAİ. TURNİNG TO DAYAN' S VIEWS ON SİNAİ, YAACOBİ SAİD THAT VAGUE DİSCUSSİON İN İSRAELİ PRESS THİS WİNTER ABOUT POSSİBİLİTY OF " ELECTRONİC BORDERS" BETWEEN İSRAEL AND HER NEİGHBORS TO ENABLE İDF FROM HİGH GROUND İN OCCUPİED TERROTORIES TO MAİNTAIN ELECTRONİC SURVEİLLANCE OF NEİGHBORİNG COUNTRİES' AIRFİELDS, DREW ULTİMATE İNSPİRATION FROM PHASE OF DAYAN' S THİNKİNG AT THAT TİME. YAACOBİ CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT DAYAN CURRENTLY İS NOT TURNİNG OVER İN HİS MİND POSSİBİE WAYS İSRAEL COULD STİMULATE SADAT İNTO TAKİNG SECOND LOOK AT İNTERİM SUEZ SETTLEMENT, AND YAACOBİ' S READING OF DAYAN ON THİS SUBMECT WAS SOMEWHAT DATED. YAACOBİ SAİD DAYAN ASSUMES EVERYONE AGRESS NOTHING CONCRETE CAN BE DONE ABOUT NEW ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND İSRAEL UNTİL AFTER İSRAELİ ELECTIONS THİS FALL. YAACOBİ DESCİBED DAYAN' S MOST RECENT THİNKİNG RE ACCOMMODATION WITH

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EGYPT AS FOLLOWS.

A. DEMİLİTARİZATION. YAACOBİ SAİD DAYAN WOULD LİKE MİLİTARY VACUUM İN SİNAİ WITH NEİTHER İSRAEL; NOR EGYPTİAN COMBAT FORCES THERE. SOLE MİLİTARY PRESENCE WOULD BE İSRAELİ AND ALSO EGYPTİAN CREWS OF TECNNICIANS LOCATED ON MOUNTAIN TOPS İN MİDDLE OF SİNAİ TO MAİNTAIN SURVEİLLANCE OF MİLİTARY AIRFİELDS İN POPULATED AREAS OF EGYPT AND İSRAEL. WHEN ASKED WHETHER THİS MEANT DAYAN UNDER FİNAL SETTLEMENT WOULD GİVE UP İDEA OF İSRAELİ MİLİTARY PRESENCE AT SHARM EL- SHEİKH, YAACOBİ ADMİTTED ONE WOULD HAVE TO DESCİBE SHARM EL- SHEİKH AS PART OF SİNAİ REGARDLESS OF WHİCH SİDE CONTROLLED İT AND SAİD THAT DAYAN' S AUTOMATIC REACTION, İF ASKED TODAY, WOULD BE THAT İSRAEL MUST MAİNTAIN PERMANENT FORCES AT SHARM. YET İF FİNAL SETTLEMENT WITH EGYPT BECAME REALİSTİC PROSPECT, YAACOBİ' S OPİNİON WAS THAT DAYAN MİGHT AGREE TO REMOVAL OF FORCES FROM SHARM PROVIDED EGYPT AGREED TO MİLİTARY VACUUM CONCEPT FOR ENTİRE SİNAİ AND ALSO AGREED TO İSRAELİ ADMINİSTRATION OVER SHARM AND LAND CORRIDOR TO İT.

B. BOUNDARY. YAACOBİ SAİD THERE İS BROAD CONSENSUS  
TODAY IN LABOR PARTY THAT FINAL BOUNDARY BETWEEN EGYPT AND  
ISRAEL SHOULD BE STRAİGH T LINE FROM SHARM EL- SHEİKH TO A POINT  
ON MEDITERRANE  
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ACTION SS-25

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AND WEST OF EILAT, BUT ONLY IN RETURN FOR FACE- SAVING ISRAELI  
CONCESSION OF SMALL PIECE OF DESERT AROUND EL AUJA,  
YAACOBİ REMARKED DAYAN WAS JUST DARING ENOUGH THAT IF HE WERE  
CONVINCED EGYPTIANS WERE SERIOUS ABOUT PEACE, HE MIGHT AGREE.

C. SOVEREIGNTY OVER SHARM EL- SHEİKH. YAACOBİ SAİD THAT  
ALTHOUGH DAYAN, AS NOTED, İNCLINED TOWARD LABOR PARTY  
CONSENSUS FAVORING NEW BOUNDARY IN SINAI, HE HAD NEVER SAİD  
SO. YAACOBİ FELT DAYAN PROBABLY STILL ADHERES TO LABOR PARTY  
ORAL TORAH OF 1969 ON İSSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER SHARM EL-  
SHEİKH AND LAND CORRIDOR TO İT. ORAL TORAH CALLS FOR THESE  
AREAS TO BE UNDER ISRAELI " ADMINISTRATION," AND " ADMINISTRATION"  
DİD NOT NECESSARILY MEAN SOVEREIGNTY. YAACOBİ ADDED THAT " ADMINI-  
STRATION" DOES MEAN MORE THAN " CONTROL," WORD THAT DAYAN  
CURRENTLY  
İS USING TO DESCRİBE ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP TO THAT PART OF WEST  
BANK WHİCH DAYAN WOULD BE WILLİNG TO SEE PLACED UNDER  
THEORETICAL SOVEREIGNTY OF ARAB STATE EAST OF JORDAN RİVER UNDER  
FINAL SETTLEMENT. YET DAYAN HAD NEVER CALLED FOR SHARM OR İTS  
CORRIDOR TO BE İNCORPORATED İNTO ISRAEL AND FLY ISRAELI FLAG, AND  
YAACOBİ DOUBTED THAT ATTRİBUTES OF SOVEREIGNTY İN THIS CASE WERE  
İMPORTANT TO DAYAN.

7. COMMENT. YAACOBİ' S SPECULATION ABOUT DAYAN' S İNNERMOST  
THOUGHTS ON HOW FAR ISRAEL CAN GO TO REACH ACCOMMODATION WITH

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EGYPT SUPPORTS OUR BELIEF THAT DAYAN A) STRONGLY DESIRES MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH EGYPT, AND B) IS THE ONE ISRAELI LEADER WHO LOOKS AT THIS PROBLEM IMAGINATIVELY. IT ALSO SHOWS HOW DAYAN BLOWS HOT AND COLD ON SUBJECT. WHEN IN ICONOCLASTIC MOOD, SEEKING RECONSIDERATION OF OLD ASSUMPTIONS BY ISRAELIS, HE CAN SHOCK PUBLIC WITH NEW IDEAS; WHEN TROUBLED BY BELLICOSE TALK OUT OF CAIRO ( OR BY US PROBES FOR ISRAELI CONCILIATORY GESTURE TOWARD EGYPT), HE CAN TAKE VERY TOUGH LINE RE SINAI. IF NEGOTIATING PROCESS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT SHOULD EVER GET UNDER WAY, DAYAN WOULD PROBABLY NUMBER AMONG ADVOCATES OF HARD OPENING POSITION BUT MIGHT BE PREPARED EVENTUALLY TO MOVE FARTHER THAN SOME ISRAELI LEADERS TO ACHIEVE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. ZURHELLEN

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